A new political debate has emerged in Bangladesh, centered on relations with India and China. One camp argues that the BNP-led government is seeking to normalize and maintain pragmatic relations with India after assuming power. Another camp, however, believes that the exaggerated anti-India rhetoric of Jamaat-e-Islami and the National Citizen Party (NCP) is creating a political environment that could ultimately strengthen Hindu nationalist forces within India.
Political analysts suggest that recent attempts to question the legitimacy of the July 2024 uprising are not merely part of a political debate. Rather, they may represent a coordinated effort to partially rehabilitate the image and actions of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. At the same time, the growing tendency of political actors to label one another as “pro-India” is making India’s influence more visible in Bangladesh’s political discourse instead of reducing it.
Recent controversies surrounding the construction of a temple in Palashbari, demonstrations both for and against temples in Dhaka and other areas, social media campaigns promoting and opposing Hindutva ideology, and the openly anti-India positions of Jamaat and the NCP have all contributed to a new political reality. Simultaneously, attempts to portray the BNP government as “pro-India” on social media have intensified. As a result, considerable debate has emerged regarding the BNP’s actual political position.
According to Dr. Nurul Amin Bepari, a senior professor of Political Science at the University of Dhaka, the BNP currently holds a relatively advantageous position from a strategic perspective. He points to Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s response when asked about future relations with India shortly after assuming office. Rahman stated, “If the people of my country want it, there will be good relations.”
According to Dr. Bepari, this statement conveyed a clear message: Bangladesh’s relationship with India will be determined by the will of its people and the country’s national interests, rather than by any submissive diplomatic approach.
He cites the Teesta water-sharing issue as a practical example of this policy. Tarique Rahman had previously declared that Bangladesh’s fair share of water from the 54 transboundary rivers shared with India is not a matter of charity but a right guaranteed under international law. He had also warned that Bangladesh could seek international intervention, including through the United Nations, if necessary.
Dr. Bepari argues that the government has maintained this position after assuming office. The Teesta Barrage Project is reportedly moving forward, while technical discussions on the Ganges Water Sharing Agreement continue. In his view, these developments reflect a policy of negotiation and strategic bargaining rather than diplomatic weakness.
He further notes that the banning of the Awami League, legal actions against its allies, and the continuation of the Teesta project indicate that the BNP government is not operating according to Indian directives. Had the government intended to pursue a submissive relationship with New Delhi, such political decisions would likely not have been taken.
However, Dr. Bepari acknowledges that governing requires a different approach from opposition politics. Statements that may be easily made while in opposition are often more difficult when managing state affairs. In this context, he believes the BNP government is attempting to pursue a balanced foreign policy between India and China.
China’s growing importance in Bangladesh’s foreign policy has also attracted attention. Reports suggest that Prime Minister Tarique Rahman may soon visit Beijing at the invitation of the Chinese government. Many observers view his decision to prioritize China rather than India for a major official foreign visit as a significant strategic signal.
On the other hand, some analysts argue that the aggressive anti-India rhetoric of Jamaat and the NCP may inadvertently benefit Hindu nationalist forces in India. They point out that Bangladesh became a major topic during the recent West Bengal state election campaign. Allegations concerning the treatment of religious minorities in Bangladesh were reportedly used by India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as political campaign material.
Journalist and political analyst Sardar Farid Ahmed rejects this interpretation. He argues that it is inaccurate to suggest that anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh contributed to the rise of the BJP. According to him, Sheikh Hasina remained in power in Bangladesh until 2024, while the BJP first came to power in India in 2014. Therefore, linking Bangladesh’s political discourse directly to the BJP’s rise lacks logical foundation.
He further argues that criticizing India’s regional dominance or perceived hegemonic policies should not automatically be interpreted as strengthening the BJP. In his view, such narratives often serve political purposes unrelated to the actual issues at hand.
Another concern raised by political analysts is that Jamaat and the NCP increasingly emphasize religious identity in their political messaging, more so than the BNP. This trend could gradually attract a segment of the BNP’s traditional nationalist voter base toward religion-based politics, potentially creating long-term challenges for the party.
Dr. Rashed Alam Bhuiyan, a political scientist at the University of Dhaka, observes that a perception is emerging among the public that the BNP has become politically dependent on India. Whether true or not, he says, such perceptions are creating confusion among BNP supporters. Public dissatisfaction with some government ministers has also become evident, creating opportunities for Jamaat to expand its political influence.
According to Dr. Rashed, the ongoing debate surrounding the 2024 uprising carries significant implications for Bangladesh’s future politics. If the uprising becomes politically controversial, the Awami League may gradually regain relevance. In that scenario, anti-India voters could shift toward Jamaat and the NCP, potentially transforming the country's political competition into a contest between the Awami League and a Jamaat-NCP alliance.
Such a development could leave the BNP politically marginalized, a possibility that cannot be entirely dismissed.
He also warns that reports suggesting the re-emergence of controversial political actors from past political crises should concern the BNP leadership. Failure to distinguish between genuine allies and opportunists within both the party and the government could weaken the party from within.
Mohammad Imran Ahmed, a researcher at the University of Warwick in England, believes it is still too early to determine whether either the BNP or Jamaat-NCP is falling into a political trap. However, he argues that the public is increasingly concerned with effective governance, price stability, law and order, and the fulfillment of democratic commitments rather than political slogans.
According to him, the BNP’s greatest challenge is to clearly articulate its ideological position while maintaining dignified and mutually beneficial relations with neighboring countries.
He concludes that if the BNP can successfully balance the spirit of the 2024 uprising, national interests, and its commitments to good governance, it stands to benefit politically. Failure to do so, however, could deepen existing doubts and uncertainties, creating opportunities for political opponents to capitalize on public dissatisfaction.
Overall, Bangladesh’s contemporary political landscape is being shaped by a complex interplay of India-China relations, nationalism, religious identity, and the legacy of the 2024 political transformation. Ultimately, which political force gains or loses from this evolving equation will depend on strategic decisions, public engagement, and the effectiveness of governance in the years ahead.