The question of reform has long been a persistent and urgent theme in Bangladesh’s political discourse. But what kind of reform is truly needed—fundamental or qualitative? Finding the answer to this question is now more important than ever.
Historically, Bangladesh has undergone three major waves of fundamental reform. The first came in 1971 with the birth of an independent, sovereign state through the Liberation War. The second was in 1975, when the late President Ziaur Rahman established the ideology of Bangladeshi nationalism grounded in national identity and religious values. The third occurred under Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia, who reinstated parliamentary democracy.
Having already achieved these foundational milestones, citizens today demand qualitative change—better governance, accountability, and fairness—rather than another overhaul of the state’s basic structure.
The July Uprising and the Demand for Change
The July 2024 popular uprising, aimed at restoring democracy and good governance, marked a major turning point in Bangladesh’s modern political history. Following this upheaval, the people’s foremost expectation was qualitative reform: the establishment of a just, transparent, and accountable system of governance.
However, even after 53 years of independence, when the National Consensus Commission was finally formed and the historic July Charter was signed on 17 October 2025 after months of deliberation, many questioned whether the foundation of this reform process was strong enough to deliver real change.
Reform initiatives have so far been confined largely to meetings, discussions, and dialogues among the political and civil elite. As the nation moves toward the 13th National Parliamentary Election, the question remains: how far can such dialogue translate into genuine democratic transformation?
Echoes from the Past: The 1/11 Reform Era
Bangladesh faced a similar wave of “reform dialogue” during the 2007–08 caretaker government (commonly known as the 1/11 era). Then too, national consultations began with much optimism, but ultimately failed amid mutual distrust and hidden agendas.
On 22 May 2008, the caretaker government formally launched talks with parties like the Workers Party and Bikalpa Dhara. While the government insisted the dialogue would succeed, most political actors saw it as a pre-scripted exercise lacking credibility. Many believed the process was designed to weaken genuine opposition forces while protecting corrupt, unpopular elites.
In an article published on 5 July 2008 in Dainik Dinkal titled “A Brief Note on Dialogue,” this writer observed that the success of such dialogue depended on trust, transparency, and credible elections—elements that were then conspicuously absent.
The Role of the Consensus Commission
Fast forward to 2025: under the interim government led by Nobel laureate Professor Muhammad Yunus, a new National Consensus Commission was established on 13 February. The commission began consultations with various political parties soon after.
The first meeting, chaired by Professor Yunus, was held on 15 February at the Foreign Service Academy with parties that boycotted the January 2024 one-sided election under Sheikh Hasina’s government. Subsequent sessions, chaired by Professor Ali Riaz, continued through March with leaders including Dr. Col. (Retd.) Oli Ahmed of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).
Meanwhile, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) continued to advance its own comprehensive reform agenda—beginning with Begum Khaleda Zia’s Vision 20–30 in 2017 and followed by Acting Chairman Tarique Rahman’s 31-point State Reform Plan announced on 13 July 2023.
BNP’s supporters argue that if the Consensus Commission had taken Ziaur Rahman’s 19-point plan, Begum Khaleda Zia’s Vision 20–30, and Tarique Rahman’s 31-point reforms as a minimum framework, the nation’s path toward welfare and reform could have been far more inclusive and credible.
However, critics believe the Commission’s final approach primarily reflected its own institutional agenda rather than a genuine synthesis of national consensus.
BNP’s Critique and the Question of Representation
On 30 October 2025, BNP Secretary General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir publicly denounced the commission’s one-year dialogue process as “futile, theatrical, and deceptive to the nation.”
In his words, “We sincerely wish for the success of reform efforts, but as a responsible political party, we must speak the truth—this process has failed to reflect the will of the people.”
This raises a critical question: how participatory and transparent has the reform process truly been? If major political parties’ reform visions—particularly BNP’s 31-point framework—are not even considered as a baseline, can this reform process claim to represent the people?
Reform Beyond Rhetoric
Reform cannot be limited to charters, signatures, or ceremonial dialogues. Its success depends on trust among political actors, transparency in execution, and alignment with citizens’ aspirations.
Without these, the July Charter and the ongoing reform process risk becoming yet another paper exercise—a cosmetic exercise in dialogue rather than a sustainable pathway toward a just and democratic state.
About the Author:
Shairul Kabir Khan is a political analyst and cultural activist.